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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of regulations on sell-side analystsresearch. These regulations NASD
Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Analyst Research Settlement  attempted to mitigate
the interdependence between research and investment bank departments of U.S. brokerage houses.
We document that since the regulations have been in place, many brokerage houses have migrated
from the traditional ve-tier rating system to a coarser three-tier system. In addition, optimistic
recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic
recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informa-
tiveness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no
longer depends on whether analysts are a¢ liated with the covered rm, although a¢ liated analysts
are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. An analysis of price reactions to recommen-
dations provides mixed evidence on whether investors discount a¢ liated recommendations to a lesser
extent than they did before the regulations.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, academic studies, regulators, and the nancial press have pointed to sell-side
research that is tainted by conicts of interest between investment banking and research departments
of U.S. brokerage rms.1 The stock market crash of 2000-2001 triggered concerns that investors were
being misled by analystsbiased research. Changes in the regulatory environment began in July 2002,
with the new NASD Rule 2711 and the amended NYSE Rule 472 on sell-side research. In December
2002, the Global Analyst Research Settlement involving ten U.S. investment banks (the sanctioned
banks) was formally announced.2 The purpose of these regulations was to curb conicts of interest
that a¤ected analysts research by substantially limiting relations between research and investment
banking departments. The new rules also established stringent disclosure requirements that intended
to make research output more meaningful.
This study investigates the impact of these regulatory changes on analystsrecommendations. Have
analyst recommendations become more informative following the regulations? Did the regulations
mitigate the e¤ects of conicts of interest? Furthermore, did the regulations a¤ect the response of
investors to analystsrecommendations?
We analyze stock recommendations and price reactions to them before the regulations (the Pre-Reg
period), and after the regulations (the Post-Reg period). Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman
(2006) show that the distribution of recommendations in the Post-Reg period has become more bal-
anced, as analysts are more likely to issue pessimistic or neutral recommendations compared to the
Pre-Reg period. We show that the new pattern of recommendations coincided with the adoption of
new rating systems. Following the regulations, most leading investment banks moved from the tradi-
tional ve-tier rating system to a coarser three-tier rating system over a short period of time (typically
one day). The adoption of new rating systems was accompanied by banks completely reshu­ ing their
recommendations, obtaining a more balanced distribution. We document, however, that while the
adoption of rating systems implied massive reclassications of outstanding recommendations, it was
somewhat technical, as it did not elicit signicant price reactions. Although the reclassication itself
1Examples in the nancial press include Merrill Alters a Policy on Analysts,Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2001;
Shoot All the Analysts, Financial Times, March 20, 2001; Where Mary Meeker Went Wrong, Fortune, May 14,
2001, and Outlook for Analysts: Skepticism and Blame,Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2001.
2The original ten investment rms included in the Global Settlementare Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston,
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup
Global Markets, UBS Warburg, and U.S. Bancorp Piper Ja¤ray. In August 2004 Deutsche Bank and Thomas Weisel
joined the settlement, bringing the total number of participants to twelve.
may be cosmetic to some extent, an ongoing use of a coarser grid of recommendations may signicantly
reduce their informativeness, and hence may have real economic e¤ects.
We thus examine the informativeness of recommendations, as proxied by investorsreactions, and
how it was a¤ected by the regulations. We start by examining conditional informativeness measured
as the abnormal price reactions to recommendations, conditional on their type (optimistic, neutral,
and pessimistic). The results suggest that investors internalized the change in the distribution of rec-
ommendations in the period following the regulations. For instance, the price response to optimistic
recommendations is more positive in the Post-Reg period, suggesting that optimistic recommenda-
tions are perceived to be more reliable. By contrast, price responses to neutral and pessimistic recom-
mendations are less negative following the regulations, since more recommendations fall under these
categories.
Note that optimistic recommendations have become more informative but less frequent, whereas
neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become less informative but more frequent. In addition,
it is likely that investors can extract less information when a coarser grid is in use. So, has the overall
informativeness of recommendations increased or decreased following the regulations? To answer
this question we examine absolute abnormal price reactions to recommendations unconditional on
their type. This allows us to pool together price reactions from di¤erent recommendation types and
estimate the overall (unconditional) informativeness of recommendations both before and after the
regulations. Higher (lower) absolute price reactions imply that on average investors learn more (less)
from recommendations, unconditionally.
We nd that the overall informativeness of recommendations has signicantly decreased following
the regulations: The absolute price reactions to stock recommendations are signicantly lower in the
Post-Reg period. This holds after controlling for changes in market volatility, analyst experience, past
market and rm performance, and changes in sample composition across the two periods. We further
show that recommendations issued by brokers who use a three-tier rating system (before or after the
regulations) provide less information to investors. Additionally, the decline in informativeness after
the regulations is stronger for sanctioned banks, all of whom have switched to a three-tier system.
These results are consistent with a causal e¤ect of the regulations on the informativeness of stock
recommendations.
We next turn to evaluating the e¤ect of the regulations on analystsconicts of interest related
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to investment banking. We identify cross-sectional variations in the exposure of analysts or covered
rms to conicts of interest related to underwriting business. We then use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach to gauge the impact of the regulations. Our main proxy for the presence of conicts of
interest is past underwriting relationship between the brokerage house and the recommended rm. It
is motivated by prior evidence which suggests that a¢ liated analysts, whose employer has business
relations with the covered rm, are more biased than una¢ liated analysts (Michaely and Womack,
1999, Dugar and Nathan, 1995, Lin and McNichols, 1998, Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001).3
We also propose two additional proxies for the presence of conicts of interest that are based on the
likelihood that a rm will raise capital in the near future. Analysts are expected to express optimism
for such rms, regardless of prior underwriting relationship, to get a share in the managing team of the
upcoming o¤ering. Given the evidence that equity o¤erings are serially correlated, our rst variable is
whether the rm has issued equity in the recent past. The second variable relies on a rms nancing
decit, using the idea that rms pressed for cash are likely to raise capital in the near future.
We document a signicant change in how conicts of interest inuence stock recommendations.
We corroborate prior research and the concerns of regulators by showing that conicts of interest were
associated with excess optimism in the Pre-Reg period. We show that in the Post-Reg period, a¢ liated
analysts are as likely to issue optimistic recommendations as una¢ liated analysts. Moreover, the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences between a¢ liated and una¢ liated analysts across the two periods is signicant,
suggesting that analysts have changed their recommendation practices. In contrast, conicts of interest
might still be inuencing pessimistic recommendations. In both the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods,
a¢ liated analysts are more reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations than una¢ liated analysts,
and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences is not signicant. When we use the alternative measures of conicts
of interest we also nd signicant changes in analysts practices. Before the regulations, analysts
were overly optimistic regarding rms that have recently issued equity, and with respect to rms
that experience nancing decit. We show that after the regulations, this optimism has declined
signicantly.
The importance of these changes could be dismissed on the grounds that rational investors would
3These studies mainly demonstrate a bias in stock recommendations. The evidence is less conclusive with respect
to other research outputs such as earnings forecasts (Dugar and Nathan, 1995, Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2003),
price targets (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2003) and long-term earnings growth forecasts (Lin and McNichols, 1998,
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 2000). Other studies of conicts of interest in sell-side research are Boni and Womack
(2002a), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003), Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2005), Barber, Lehavy, and
Trueman (2007), and Agrawal and Chen (2005).
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adjust for any bias by analysts. However, some recent evidence supports regulatorsclaim that such
changes were required: In the Pre-Reg period, retail investors acted naively, failing to adjust for biases
in analystsstock recommendations, whereas institutional investors did not (Boni and Womack, 2002b,
2003, Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007, De Franco, Lu, and Vasvari, 2007). Thus, prior to the
regulations, there appeared to be a wealth transfer from unsophisticated to sophisticated investors, in
line with the concerns of the regulators.
Finally, we examine whether investors react di¤erently to recommendations issued by potentially
conicted analysts before and after the regulations. We nd that investors discount a¢ liated neutral
recommendations to a lesser extent after the regulations. However, we do not nd such evidence for
optimistic and pessimistic recommendations.
Collectively, we view our ndings as consistent with a limited achievement of the regulationsobjec-
tives. Although the mix of recommendations has become more balanced, the overall informativeness
of recommendations has declined in the Post-Reg period. The regulations seem to have been suc-
cessful in curbing the issuance of optimistic recommendations by analysts facing potential conicts of
interest. However, a¢ liated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. Finally,
price reactions to recommendations suggest that investors have internalized some of the e¤ects of the
regulations on analystspractices.
To our knowledge, our paper is the rst comprehensive research testing the e¤ects of the regulations
on the informativeness of recommendations, and on analystsconicts of interest related to investment
banking. Our paper is related to Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006). They show that
after the regulations, the distribution of recommendations has become less skewed. We add to their
results by (i) documenting the change in rating systems; (ii) studying the change in informativeness
of recommendations; and (iii) investigating the e¤ect of the regulations on conicts of interest related
to underwriting relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the regulatory changes.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 documents the change in the rating systems and the changes
in the informativeness of the analystsrecommendations. In section 5 we examine the e¤ect of the
regulations on conicts of interest related to investment banking. We conclude in section 6.
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2 The New Regulations
During the summer of 2001, Congress held the Analyzing the Analysts hearings. Two pieces of
closely related regulations followed. First, new rules were enacted by the self regulatory organizations
(the SROs), NASD and NYSE, a¤ecting virtually all brokerage houses operating in the United States.
The second regulatory intervention was the Global Settlement, which applies directly only to the
sanctioned banks (see Footnote 2).
The SROs Regulation. In July 2002, new rules for sell-side analysts became e¤ective through
NYSE (amended Rule 472) and NASD (Rule 2711). The main purpose of the SROsnew rules was
to sever the ties between investment banking (IB) and research departments. Among other measures,
the rules limited the relationships and communications between IB and research personnel, prohibited
analyst compensation that is based on specic IB transactions, and banned subject companies from
reviewing research reports before publication (except for checking factual accuracy). The new rules also
established stringent disclosure requirements for research reports. These requirements were aimed at
providing better information to properly interpret research outputs, and to identify potential conicts
of interest. For example, along with the research report, an analyst has to disclose whether she received
compensation based on IBs revenue, whether she holds a position as an o¢ cer or a director in the
subject company, or whether the subject company is a client of the rm. Finally, to make research
output more meaningful and easily comparable across di¤erent analysts and rms, the rules prescribed
that every research report must explain the meaning of its rating system and disclose the percentage
recommendations in the buy,hold,and sellcategories.
The Global Settlement. In June 2001, the New York Attorney General began investigating Mer-
rill Lynch following a Wall Street Journal article about an alleged misconduct of security analysts.
Contrary to favorable public reports by analysts about certain stocks, internal e-mails by those same
analysts showed a clear dissatisfaction with the attractiveness of the stocks. Following the Merrill
Lynch inquiry, the Attorney General investigated other investment banks for similar issues. Suppos-
edly, from approximately mid-1999 through mid-2001, investment bankers engaged in practices that
created or maintained inappropriate inuence over research analysts, thereby tainting research with
conicts of interest. The investigations led to the Global Settlement between the SEC, the NYSE, the
NASD, the New York Attorney General, and ten (later twelve) U.S. investment rms.
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The Global Settlements objectives closely mirrored the SROsnew regulations, most importantly
with respect to severing the ties between IB and research departments. In a few cases, the Global
Settlement goes beyond the SROsnew rules. For example, it requires that IB and research depart-
ments be physically separated and that the research department have a dedicated legal department.
Besides the regulatory measures on sell-side research operations, the Global Settlement required the
sanctioned banks to pay nes and penalties totaling roughly $1.4 billion.
3 Data
Sample Period. We focus on analystsstock recommendations in the period following the enactment
of the regulations (September 2002 - December 2004), referred to as the Post-Reg period. We begin
this period in September 2002, immediately after the rst set of rules was enacted. We compare
analystsoutputs in the Post-Reg period to their outputs in the preceding period (November 2000 -
August 2002), which we label the Pre-Reg period. We begin this period in November 2000 because
Regulation FD, another substantial regulation inuencing analysts, was enacted in October 2000. Our
aim is to gauge the e¤ect of the regulations beyond what may have already been achieved as a result
of Reg FD (see Gintschel and Markov, 2004).
Stock Recommendations. Although brokerage houses produce many other pieces of information
about the stocks they track (general research reports, earnings forecasts, etc.), we focus on the e¤ects
of the regulations on stock recommendations. Recommendations were the focal point of the complaints
about conicts of interest and of the demand for the regulations. For example, the SEC describes the
purpose of the regulations as to address conicts of interest that are raised when research analysts
recommend securities in public communications (SEC Release no. 45908, p. 3). Moreover, recom-
mendations seem to represent a research output that is more binding. Elton, Gruber, and Grossman
(1986) describe recommendations as one of the few cases in evaluating information content where the
forecaster is recommending a clear and unequivocal course of action...(p. 699).4
We obtain information on stock recommendations from the IBES database.5 For rms that issued
4Conicts of interest can also inuence analysts earnings forecasts, but in this case, the inuence might occur in
more subtle ways, for example, through an outright optimistic forecast or through strategic pessimism in order to avoid
earnings disappointments. The literature on the subject presents mixed results, with some reporting an inuence of
underwriting activies on analystsforecasts (e.g., Rajan and Servaes, 1997, Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok, 2003, and
Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2003), but others not (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998, and Agrawal and Chen, 2004).
5The IBES tapes we used were downloaded between November 2005 and November 2006. These tapes are virtually
free from the data problems identied in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2007). These problems are reltaed to IBES
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equity, we label as a¢ liatedthose recommendations issued during the two years following the equity
o¤ering by analysts who are employed by either its lead underwriter(s) or by the co-manager(s). This
denition is consistent with Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2007), who argue that the interests of lead
underwriters and co-managers are similar. Some descriptive information about all stock recommenda-
tions available for our analysis is provided in Panel A of Table 1. Note that some recommendations
issued in the Post-Reg period are related to IPOs/SEOs that occurred in the Pre-Reg period. We
consider these recommendations as belonging to the Post-Reg period. The rationale is that once the
regulations are in place they apply to all recommendations, regardless of when the related o¤ering
took place.
Brokers. Our data cover all brokers issuing stock recommendations and surveyed by IBES. In some
of our analyses, we distinguish between brokers who participated in the Global Settlement and those
who did not. We term the rst group sanctioned banks and the second group non-sanctioned
banks(see Footnote 2 for a list of participants in the Global Settlement). Note that in August 2004
two additional banks joined the settlement. The results reported in the paper place only the original
ten banks in the sanctioned group, since most of our Post-Reg period precedes August 2004.6
Panel B of Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics about the equity o¤ering market during
our sample period, stratied by the types of brokerage houses. The table reveals that the sanctioned
brokerage houses dominate the IPO and SEO markets. In the Pre-Reg period they participated as
lead or co-lead underwriters in 69% of the equity o¤erings, which accounted for about 87% of the total
proceeds. In the Post-Reg period, the participation of sanctioned brokerage houses slightly decreased.
Firms. Our analysis focuses on all U.S. rms with available stock recommendations in the IBES
database. Some of our analyses require a denition of an underwriting relationship between the
analyst and the recommended rm. To achieve that, we focus on rms that issued equity, either
through an IPO or an SEO. To allow the inclusion of a¢ liated recommendations that were issued
starting in November 2000, we include IPOs and SEOs starting from November 1998. We obtain a
list of such rms from the SDC database. We exclude all closed-end funds and trusts as well as all
unit investment trusts.
tapes from 2002-2004. We have also veried the results using IBES tapes from September 2007. We thank Alexander
Ljungqvist and Felicia Marston for advising us on this issue.
6We repeated the analysis using the extended group. This change does not a¤ect any of the conclusions.
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Some descriptive statistics about our sample rms are reported in Panel C of Table 1. We separate
equity o¤erings into three subperiods. The average proceeds for SEOs in our sample ranges between
$170 and $270 million across our sample period. The average IPO proceeds ranges from $163 million
to $348 million. The average market capitalization of an SEO rm is about $4 billion. IPO rms
are smaller, on average. Despite that, IPO rms exhibit lower book-to-market ratios, reecting their
larger growth opportunities and their younger age.
Stock Returns. We obtain stock returns from CRSP. To analyze price reactions to recommendations
we use size- and industry-adjusted abnormal returns. Size-adjusted returns for each stock are computed
by subtracting from the stocks actual return the return of the CRSP market capitalization decile
portfolio corresponding to the stock. Given the prominence of industry benchmarks in the rating
systems, we also use industry-adjusted returns similar to Womack (1996) as follows. A size-adjusted
return is computed for each stock in the sample as well as for all other stocks from the NYSE and
NASDAQ in the same industry, using Fama and Frenchs 48-industries classication. The industry-
adjusted return for each stock is then computed as the di¤erence between the size-adjusted return for
the stock and the mean of the size-adjusted returns for the industry-matched stocks.
4 New Rating Systems and the Informativeness of Recommenda-
tions
4.1 Change in Rating Systems
One important aspect of the regulations is the stringent disclosure requirements imposed on how in-
formation is produced and disseminated by the brokerage houses. The new rules aimed at providing
investors with better information to make assessments of a rms research(SEC Release No. 45908,
p. 7), expressing concern about rating systems that were loosely dened and perhaps not properly
understood by the researchs consumers. By analyzing the IBES database, articles in the media, and
information from each brokerage houses web site, we collected information about general characteris-
tics of the rating system in use by each sanctioned brokerage house, and whether a new rating system
was adopted after 2001.
The analysis indicates a widespread transition to new rating systems along with the adoption of
the new regulations. Every new rating system adopted a three-tier scale, in contrast with the then
traditional ve-tier scale. Overall, in the Post-Reg period, about 75% of all IBES recommendations
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are issued using a three-tier system, as opposed to 17% in the Pre-Reg period. In particular, all of the
ten original participants in the Global Settlement adopted a new rating system (eight of them in 2002
and the other two later on). Ten of the next twenty biggest brokerage houses adopted a new rating
system starting in 2002. The motivation for this change can be linked to the disclosure requirements of
the regulations that regardless of the rating system that a member employs, a member must disclose
in each report the percentage of all securities rated by the member which the member would assign a
buy, hold/neutral or sell rating(Rule 2711, p. 7).
Given the widespread adoption of new rating systems, we investigate these events in more detail.
Table 2 reports summary statistics about these events for all eight original participants in the Global
Settlement that adopted new systems in 2002. There is a concentrated adoption of new systems in
September 2002 (ve adoptions, four of them on the same day), and only one such adoption occurred
before July 2002 (the month when the new NASD and NYSE regulations took e¤ect). The adoption
date of most new rating systems coincided with the introduction of the rule that brokerage houses have
to disclose the distribution of the outstanding recommendations together with each research report.
All brokerage houses reduced their coverage when they adopted the new rating system: The second
and third columns of Table 2 show an average reduction of 12% in the size of each brokerage houses
portfolios.7 The next set of columns reports how the new recommendations are distributed among the
three rating levels. All but the second brokerage house ended up with about 20% of recommendations
being pessimistic; this is particularly remarkable given that all these brokerage houses had, on the day
before the new rating systems took e¤ect, less than 2% of their covered rms rated at a pessimistic
level.
We next analyze the previous classication of the new recommendations in each rating category.
The new distribution is not achieved by the addition of new rms to the portfolio of tracked rms, as the
fraction of initiations of coverage in each category never reaches more than 1% of the nal portfolio.
Instead, new distributions were obtained by reshu­ ing  and, for the most part, downgrading 
outstanding recommendations. More than 90% of the newly rated pessimistic recommendations were
rated at least neutral under the old system, and more than 40% of the new neutral recommendations
7 In unreported results, we analyze for each brokerage house the sample of rms whose coverage was discontinued.
Results suggest that the decision to drop a rm was related to size and past performance rather than the rms future
prospects. Thus, the tendency of analysts to drop rms with unfavorable prospects (e.g., McNichols and OBrien, 1997)
is not revealed here. This is not very surprising given that the goal of adopting a new ratings system was to achieve a
more balanced distribution, which required the presence of rms with unfavorable prospects in the sample of covered
rms.
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were at least buyor strong buyunder the old system. On the other hand, less than 5% of the new
optimistic recommendations were not already considered as such under the old rating system. These
results suggest that during the change in rating systems, brokers redened their recommendations and
shifted them downwards, creating a more balanced distribution over a short period of time.
We also separately examined (but do not tabulate) the three-day price reactions and long-term
returns to recommendations issued during the event of change in rating system for the eight brokers
reported in Table 2. For the recommendations classied in an optimistic category, three-day abnormal
returns are signicantly positive for ve out of eight brokerage houses (for another brokerage house,
the event returns are signicantly negative), but the e¤ect largely disappears after six months. For
neutral and pessimistic recommendations, both event reactions and long-term returns are typically
insignicant. We conclude that during the adoption of new rating systems, reclassifying a stock did
not seem to convey new information to the market.8
The change in rating systems should be interpreted with care. While prior to the regulations
most analysts used a ve-tier scale, the vast majority of recommendations were in the strong buy,
buy,and holdcategories. Hence, one way to view the scale changes is that brokers moved from a
de-facto three-point scale with the option to use additional points in extreme cases, to a three-point
scale without such an option. This view suggests that the scale change is somewhat cosmetic.
Still, the change in rating systems may have economic consequences for two reasons. First, the
use of a de-facto three-point system prior to the regulations may have been acceptable for savvy,
institutional investors who mentally adjusted for this, reading a strong buyas a buy,a buyas a
hold,and a holdas a sell.However, retail investors may have failed to make the adjustment (see
for example Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007, De Franco, Lu, and Vasvari, 2007, and Mikhail,
Walther and Willis, 2007). Consequently, regulators were concerned with the literal meaning of the
recommendations. For example, the regulations prescribed that denitions of ratings terms also must
be consistent with their plain meaning and that a hold rating should not mean or imply that an
investor should sell a security(NASD Rule 472, p. 9). Thus, the move from a de-facto three point
scale to a scale where recommendations represent their true literal meaning may have helped retail
investors.
8Consequently, we excluded from the remaining tests all recommendations associated with the reclassication event.
The purpose of this exclusion is to distinguish between regularrecommendations, which are of interest to us, and the
one time event of change in rating system. In unreported results, we did include these recommendations, and the
conclusions of the study did not change.
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Second, a coarser grid limits the information conveyed by recommendations. Although selland
strong sellrecommendations were rarely used, such recommendations conveyed a lot of information
to investors when used (because they were so rare).9 Thus, the reduction in the number of recommen-
dation tiers might have reduced the informativeness of recommendations in the Post-Reg period. We
discuss this further in the next section when studying unconditional informativeness.
4.2 Informativeness of Analyst Recommendations
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) show that prior to the regulations, the distribution
of recommendations was heavily tilted toward optimistic recommendations, whereas following the reg-
ulations the distribution has become more balanced. The recommendation frequencies reported in
Table 3 are consistent with their observations. In this section we study the informativeness of stock
recommendations by examining the price responses to them before and after the regulations. We dis-
tinguish between the informativeness of specic recommendation types (conditional informativeness)
and the overall informativeness of recommendations (unconditional informativeness).
Conditional Informativeness. If investors internalized the change in the distribution of recommen-
dations following the regulations, then recommendations in the Post-Reg period should entail di¤erent
price reactions compared to the Pre-Reg period. When an analyst is highly optimistic, buyrecom-
mendations are issued for a large variety of rms, and hence are not so informative. By contrast, sell
recommendations are issued only for a small set of poorly performing rms, and hence convey very neg-
ative information. When analysts become less optimistic, buyrecommendations are restricted to a
smaller and better subset of rms, and hence become more informative, while sellrecommendations
are applied to a larger set of rms, and are hence less informative. Thus, we expect a more positive
price response to buyrecommendations and less negative price response to sellrecommendations
following the regulations. Similarly, the average quality of rms recommended hold is expected to
improve following the regulations, resulting in a less negative price reaction to such recommendations.
To test the above predictions we estimate the following model applied to the periods before and
after the regulations:
RET = 1OPT + 2NEU + 3PESS + Controls+ "; (1)
9This is similar to the grading of MBA students. Some schools have a four-point scale (ABCD), yet Ds are rarely
used. One view is that nothing would change if the scale would be just ABC. However, when the option to use D remains,
any such grade (however rare) conveys a lot of information about the student. We thank a referee for pointing out this
analogy.
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where RET is the relevant abnormal stock return over the three days surrounding the recommendation,
adjusted for size and industry, and OPT; NEU; and PESS are dummy variables for optimistic,
neutral, and pessimistic recommendations.
Results are reported in Table 3. The three-day price reactions to optimistic recommendations in
the Post-Reg period are about 80% greater than in the Pre-Reg period (2.20% vs. 1.21%). The three-
day price reactions to neutral and pessimistic recommendations are signicantly less negative than in
the previous period. For neutral recommendations, the price reaction is 60% less negative (-1.76%
vs. -4.46%), whereas for pessimistic recommendations, the price reaction is about 50% less negative
(-3.97% vs. -7.45%). These results are consistent with the predictions derived above. The results are
qualitatively similar after controlling for past rm and market performance and analyst experience.
To further explore the e¤ect of the change in rating systems discussed in the previous section we
examined a modied version of Table 3 in which we dene the independent variables in the Pre-Reg
period as follows: OPT includes only strong buy recommendations, NEU includes only buy
recommendations, and PESS includes hold,underperform,and sell.We then re-estimate the
Pre-Reg regressions and test for equality of coe¢ cients across the Pre- and Post-Reg periods. This
modied analysis relies on the premise that strong buyrecommendations in the Pre-Reg period were
largely transformed into optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period; buyrecommendations
in the Pre-Reg period were largely transformed into neutral in the Post-Reg period; and hold,
underperform, and sell, recommendations into pessimistic. While this premise is not entirely
supported by the data,10 this analysis sheds more light on the consequences of the change in rating
systems.
Untabulated results show that the price reaction to optimistic (pessimistic) recommendations in
the Post-Reg period is not statistically di¤erent from the price reactions to strong buy (hold,
underperform,and sell) recommendations in the Pre-Reg period. This suggests that the change
in rating system is somewhat cosmetic, and reects a renaming of the di¤erent categories. Further,
this specication shows again that buy recommendations have become more informative as they
are largely viewed now as strong buy recommendations prior to the regulations. By contrast,
10The frequency of optimistic recommendations in the Post-Reg period is about 42% whereas the frequency of strong
buy recommendations in the Pre-Reg is about 28%. Thus, not all Pre-Reg buy recommendations were shifted into
neutral. Similarly, the frequency of neutral recommendations in the Post-Reg period is 47% while the frequency of buy
recommendations in the Pre-Reg period is 29%. Thus, a signicant portion of neutral recommendations in the Post-Reg
period did not emanate from previous buy recommendations. A similar argument applies to the hold category.
Additionally, Table 2 shows that a simple mapping was not exclusively used at the events of changes in rating systems.
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sellrecommendations have become less informative as the information they carry is similar to that
conveyed by several categories prior to the regulations.
Unconditional Informativeness. Table 3 reveals that with the new regulations, optimistic recom-
mendations have become more informative but also less frequent (42% vs. 58%), while pessimistic and
neutral recommendations have become more prevalent but less informative. Thus, highly informative
recommendations have become less common, whereas less informative recommendations have become
more common. The overall e¤ect of the regulations on informativeness is not clear. In addition, the
move from a ve-tier to a three-tier rating system by many investment banks may have lowered the
informativeness of recommendations. In an extreme case of only one tier, a recommendation would not
convey any information (except for the fact that the analyst has chosen to issue one). More generally,
coarser recommendation grids likely entail a lower level of information transmission.
To evaluate the consequences of the regulations, we take a broader view and assess the overall
change in the informativeness of stock recommendations. This analysis takes into account the po-
tentially conicting forces of the change in the distribution of recommendations, the change in the
informativeness of each recommendation type, and the change in rating system. We use the absolute
value of price reactions as a measure of informativeness. This allows us to include all types of rec-
ommendations in one analysis despite the di¤erent directions of price reactions they entail. This is in
contrast to the analysis in Table 3, where we were interested in the conditional informativeness and
therefore reported the signed price reactions. The unconditional expected abnormal price reaction
(denoted by E (ABS_RET )) can be written as:
E (ABS_RET ) =
NX
i=1
E (ABS_RET jrec_typei) Pr (rec_typei) ;
where N is the number of recommendation categories. It is a weighted average of the conditional
absolute price reactions. The regulations have a¤ected the conditional price reactions, the weights
(probabilities) of the di¤erent recommendation categories, and the number of categories (N). The
change in the average absolute price reaction encapsulates all of these e¤ects. Higher (lower) average
absolute price reactions imply that investors learn more (less) from recommendations unconditionally.
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We estimate the following model for all recommendations in our sample period:
ABS_RET = 0 + 1POST + 2TIER3 + 3SANCT + 4SANCT  POST (2)
+5PASTFIRMPERF + 6PASTMKTPERF + 7MKT_STD
+8EXPERIENCE + 9EXPERIENCE  POST + ";
where ABS_RET is the absolute value of the abnormal size- and industry-adjusted three-day price
reactions to recommendations, and POST is a dummy taking a value of 1 in the Post-Reg period. The
sign of the coe¢ cient of POST indicates whether the regulations are associated with an increase or
a decrease in the unconditional informativeness of stock recommendations. Furthermore, to examine
whether the change in informativeness is related to the regulations in a causal manner, we use two
additional variables: (i) TIER3 which is a dummy equal to 1 if the broker had been using a three-tier
rating system at the time the recommendation was issued;11 and (ii) SANCT which is a dummy equal
to 1 if the recommendation was issued by a sanctioned bank. We hypothesize that recommendations
issued by brokers that use a three-tier rating system are less informative (a negative 2). Furthermore,
since sanctioned banks have all moved to a three-tier rating system following the regulations, we
hypothesize that their recommendations have become less informative (negative 4). We control for
past rm and market performance (PASTFIRMPERF and PASTMKTPERF ) to account for
momentum e¤ects, for the standard deviation of market returns (MKT_STD) to account for any
changes in volatility that may a¤ect price reactions, and for analyst experience.
Table 4 reports the results. In all specications the POST dummy has a negative and signicant
coe¢ cient, suggesting that the overall informativeness of recommendations is lower in the Post-Reg
period. The economic magnitude of this e¤ect is also signicant: Using column (3) we learn that
the average absolute abnormal price reaction to a recommendation has decreased from about 7.1% to
about 5.3%, a decline of about 25% in the overall informativeness of recommendations.12
As hypothesized, the coe¢ cient of TIER3 is signicantly negative, indicating that the use of three
tiers is associated with lower informativeness of recommendations. Based on column (3), the decline
in unconditional informativeness is about 12%. Additionally, a signicantly negative coe¢ cient of
11To generate TIER3, for each broker, we identify the rst and last date in which each recommendation type appears
in the IBES database. Based on these dates we infer the time periods during which the broker used a three-, four-, or
ve-tier rating system.
12A concern is that these results are a¤ected by a change in the composition of rms followed by analysts before and
after the regulations. We have repeated this analysis restricting attention only to rms covered in both periods. The
conclusions are not a¤ected by this change.
14
SANCT POST reveals that recommendations from sanctioned banks have become less informative
following the regulations. This reinforces the view that a move to a three-tier system had a causal
e¤ect on the informativeness of recommendations. Note, however, that even after controlling for these
additional explanatory variables, the POST dummy remains signicant, suggesting that there might
be some other unidentied e¤ects causing the reduction in informativeness.13 For example, Chen and
Marquez (2005) argue that lower informativeness of recommendations following the regulations can be
tied to reduced information transmission between investment banking and research departments due
to strict information barriers.
In summary, the results above suggest that analyst recommendations have become less informative,
unconditionally, following the regulations. The use of a three-tier rating system is associated with lower
informativeness. Recommendations issued by sanctioned banks, all of which moved to a three-tier
system, have become less informative.
5 Conicts of Interest Related to Investment Banking
We next analyze the e¤ect of the regulations on the ties between investment banking and research. Our
approach here is to identify cross-sectional variations in the exposure of di¤erent groups of analysts or
covered rms to conicts of interest related to investment banking. We then examine the di¤erence
between groups that are likely to be tainted and those that are not, and compare these di¤erences
across the two time periods - before and after the regulations. This di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach
diminishes calendar e¤ects of potential omitted variables.
We rst proxy for conicts of interest using a¢ liation, which is based on prior underwriting rela-
tionships. We then turn to alternative proxies that capture expected future underwriting relationships.
Finally, we study how the regulations a¤ected price reactions to recommendations with di¤erent levels
of conicts of interest.
5.1 Conicts of Interest and Underwriting Relationships
Past studies show that before the regulations, a¢ liated analysts were more optimistic about the
prospects of rms underwritten by their employer than una¢ liated analysts covering the same rms.14
13Note that we control directly for analysts experience, hence it is unlikely that the results on informativenes are
driven by this variable.
14Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), and McNichols, OBrien, and Pamukcu (2006) all show that
the average recommendation issued by a¢ liated analysts was more optimistic than the average recommendation issued
by una¢ liated analysts for di¤erent sample periods spanning 1983 to 2001.
15
Two explanations are provided for this result. According to the selection bias explanation, rms
are likely to choose underwriters whose analysts are more optimistic about their prospects (McNichols
and OBrien, 1997). The strategic bias explanation argues that research departments issue more
optimistic recommendations for strategic reasons, to increase the likelihood of their rms being hired
as underwriters and/or to provide support for previously underwritten companies. The motivation of
the regulations was directly aimed at optimism resulting from strategic bias.
Our analysis focuses on rms that issued equity (IPO or SEO). We examine recommendations
issued for these rms in the 24 months following the o¤ering, and dene a recommendation as a¢ liated
if it was issued by a brokerage house that was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in the o¤ering.15
Table 5 reports the frequency of recommendations for the sample used in this analysis. Panels A
and B break the sample by a¢ liated and una¢ liated analysts. In the Pre-Reg period, 70% of a¢ liated
analystsrecommendations were optimistic, while only 49% of such recommendations were optimistic
in the Post-Reg period. On the other hand, the percentage of a¢ liated analystsrecommendations in
the holdand sellcategories increased from 28% to 44% and from 2% to 6.5%, respectively. The
changes for una¢ liated analysts are similar but smaller in magnitude. Panels C and D break the sample
by IPOs and SEOs and show a similar picture. There is a decline in optimistic recommendations for
both IPOs and SEOs in the Post-Reg period and a steep increase in pessimistic recommendations.
To study the e¤ect of the regulations on the recommendation practices of a¢ liated analysts, we
estimate two separate panel logistic models. We use rm xed e¤ects to parsimoniously control for
rm characteristics that are not varying over time, and control directly for broker characteristics and
time-varying aspects such as rm and market performance. The models take the following form:
Pr(REC = type) = 1AFF  PRE + 2SANCT  PRE + 3PASTMKTPERF  PRE (3)
+4PASTFIRMPERF  PRE + 5EXPERIENCE  PRE + 6TIER3 PRE
+7POST + 8AFF  POST + 9SANCT  POST + 10PASTMKTPERF  POST
+11PASTFIRMPERF  POST + 12EXPERIENCE  POST
+13TIER3 POST + ";
where REC is a dummy equal to 1 if the recommendation is of a certain type (optimistic or pessimistic),
AFF is a dummy equal to 1 if the recommendation was issued by an a¢ liated broker, and PRE is a
15 In untabulated tests, we also dene a¢ liation based on shorter windows of six and twelve months.
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dummy equal to 1 if the recommendation was issued in the Pre-Reg period. The remaining explanatory
variables are as in Eq. (2).
We include PASTFIRMPER and PASTMKTPERF given the overwhelming evidence that
momentum is an important determinant of new recommendations (see Womack, 1996, and Jegadeesh
et al., 2004). To quantify the di¤erential likelihood of sanctioned brokerage houses to issue a par-
ticular recommendation type, we include the SANCT dummy. Moreover, SANCT; TIER3; and
EXPERIENCE serve as controls for brokerage house and analyst-specic characteristics (see Hong,
Kubik and Solomon, 2000, for a similar approach). Finally, the control variables are interacted with
the PRE and POST dummies.16 The models we report use robust standard errors clustered at the
rm level.17
The rst two columns of Table 6 present the results for model (3). Note rst that in both models
the coe¢ cient of the POST dummy is signicant at the 1% level. It is negative for the optimistic
model and positive for the pessimistic model. This indicates that analysts, in general, are more likely
to issue pessimistic and neutral recommendations in the Post-Reg period, and less likely to issue
optimistic ones. The odds-ratio (not reported in the table) in the pessimistic model suggests that the
odds of observing a pessimistic recommendation are 270% higher in the Post-Reg period. By contrast,
the odds of observing an optimistic recommendation in the Post-Reg period are 59% lower compared
to the Pre-Reg period. This is consistent with Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006), who
nd a general change in the distribution of recommendations following the new regulations.
Our main results follow from the a¢ liation variable (AFF ). Consider rst the optimistic model.
The coe¢ cient of AFF  PRE is signicantly positive: Its odds-ratio suggests that before the reg-
ulations a¢ liated analysts were 22% more likely to issue optimistic recommendations compared to
una¢ liated analysts. By contrast, the coe¢ cient of AFF  POST is not statistically di¤erent from
zero, indicating that after the regulations, a¢ liated analysts are no longer more likely to issue op-
16Our analysis includes all the recommendations in the relevant periods except for the recommendations associated with
the change in rating system. In unreported regressions, for a given month and rm we included recommendations only if
this rm had recommendations issued by both a sanctioned and a non-sanctioned brokerage house in that month. This
is intended to control for di¤erences in the characteristics of rms for which sanctioned and non-sanctioned brokerage
houses issued recommendations. The results are similar. Following Ljungqvist et al. (2005) we also tested models
controlling for institutional ownership. The main results are not a¤ected.
17Note that the models for the two recommendation types are not mutually independent. They reect the same set of
results viewed from two di¤erent angles. It would have been desirable to pool the two separate logistic models into a single
ordered-logit model. Unfortunately this is not possible, since the Wald test rejects the parallel regression assumption,
implying that an ordered-logit (and similarly an ordered-probit) is not valid in this case. See Long and Freese (2006: p.
197-200) for details.
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timistic recommendations. Furthermore, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences comparison shows a signicant
di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients (p-value of 0.0245). The picture in the pessimistic model is quite
di¤erent, where both coe¢ cients of AFF  PRE and AFF  POST are signicantly negative, and
not signicantly di¤erent from each other: A¢ liated analysts have been reluctant to issue pessimistic
recommendations, and this behavior has not changed after the regulations.
The results also point to a major di¤erence between the rms that participated in the Global
Settlement and those that did not. The SANCT  PRE and SANCT  POST coe¢ cients indicate
that before the regulations sanctioned brokers did not di¤er in their recommendation practices from
other brokers. After the regulations they are more conservative, being more likely to issue pessimistic
recommendations and less likely to issue optimistic ones.
The results in this section should be viewed in the context of the evidence in McNichols, OBrien,
and Pamukcu (2006) who extend the study of Michaely and Womack (1999) to the period 1994-2001.
They nd that the di¤erence in 12-month returns between a¢ liated and una¢ liated recommendations
varies across years. Their results can be interpreted in two ways: Either underwriting bias was
not robust before the regulations, or it was robust, but investorsability to undo this bias changed
over the years. Given this inconclusive evidence regarding the Pre-Reg period, one may question
the need for the regulations and the importance of our results regarding the decline in optimism
of a¢ liated analysts. Several recent papers help clarify this issue.18 They show that unsophisticated
investors could not completely undo the bias of a¢ liated analysts, suggesting a wealth transfer between
unsophisticated and sophisticated investors in the Pre-Reg period. Thus, our result of a reduction in
a¢ liated analystsoptimism in the Post-Reg period is important since it implies a lower likelihood of
such a wealth transfer. This is consistent with regulatorsgoal to prevent research from misleading
unsophisticated investors.
5.2 Conicts of Interest and Expected Equity O¤erings
In this section we propose alternative proxies for conicts of interest between research and investment
banking that are based on future expected underwriting business, as opposed to past underwriting re-
lationships. We argue that analysts covering rms that have recently undergone an equity o¤ering face
conicts of interest regardless of whether their brokerage house was a part of the leading underwriting
team. This claim is anchored on two assumptions: First, analysts express optimism in an attempt
18See Boni and Womack (2002b, 2003), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), and De Franco, Lu, and Vasvari (2007).
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to win future underwriting business (currying favor).19 Second, rms that raised equity recently
are more likely to raise equity in the future.20 Together, these assumptions suggest that analysts
have incentives to strategically inate their recommendations for rms that have recently undergone
an equity o¤ering, to increase their chances of winning the likely future underwriting business. We
emphasize that this strategic optimism is independent of a¢ liation. That is, it applies to all analysts
covering rms unconditionally on their past underwriting relationships.
The analysis in Section 5.1 was restricted to rms that issued equity in the two years prior to the
recommendation. To capture the new dimension of conicts of interest we expand the dataset to include
recommendations issued for all rms during our sample period. We then classify a recommendation for
a rm that has issued equity in the two preceding years as an SEO/IPO recommendation by assigning
a value of 1 to an indicator variable labeled SEOIPO. We test whether analyst optimism (regardless
of a¢ liation) is associated with a recent equity o¤ering, and whether the regulations a¤ected this
optimism, using models similar to (3) with the additional SEOIPO dummy interacted with PRE
and POST:
The market timing literature o¤ers an alternative explanation for optimistic analyst recommen-
dations following equity o¤erings. It may be that managers try to time the o¤erings to periods in
which analysts are bullish about the issuing rm. This is similar to the claim in Baker and Wurgler
(2002) that managers time their equity o¤erings to periods when equity is overpriced. This alternative
explanation raises concerns regarding the causal e¤ect of a recent o¤ering on analystsoptimism. We
address these concerns in several ways. First, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach: To the extent
that the regulations did not a¤ect the market timing behavior of managers, any di¤erence between
the optimism of analysts for SEOIPO vs. non-SEOIPO rms across the two periods is attributed to
the e¤ect of the regulations on conicts of interest. Second, we control in our models for past rm
19Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) nd no evidence that aggressive analyst recommendation practices increase
their banks probability of winning a lead underwriting position in future o¤erings. However, several recent papers provide
additional insights on this issue. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2007) show that aggressively optimistic research
for an issuer attracts co-management appointments, which in turn substantially increase a banks chances of winning
lead-underwriting positions in the future. Derrien (2007) and Bradley, Clarke, and Cooney (2007) also present evidence
consistent with the currying favor hypothesis, but point out some subtleties related to the banks prestige and sample
period.
20 In each year between 1998 and 2004, about 4% of all listed rms on NYSE and NASDAQ raised equity through an
SEO. In comparison, in each year during this time period, about 13% of all rms that issued equity in the prior two years
have issued equity again. That is, the probability of equity o¤ering conditional on a recent equity o¤ering (an IPO or
SEO) is over three times higher than the unconditional probability. Moreover, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) report
that between 1983 and 2000 roughly half of the IPO rms go back to raise capital externally through a security o¤ering
of any kind. They show that the average time between the IPO and the next o¤ering is about two years.
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and market performance. If market timing by managers is correlated with recent run-ups in the stock
price, it will be captured by these controls. Third, we set the indicator variable for SEOIPO to 1 only
if the recommendation was issued at least six months after the IPO or SEO. Arguably, managersde-
cision to raise equity is unlikely to be correlated with excess analystsoptimism more than six months
following the equity o¤ering. Thus, this kind of optimism is more likely to be related to expected
future underwriting business.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the results. For the optimistic model the coe¢ cient on
SEOIPOPRE is signicantly positive, indicating that prior to the regulations analysts were more
likely to issue optimistic recommendations for rms that have recently issued equity. By contrast,
the coe¢ cient on SEOIPO  POST is signicantly negative. Moreover, the likelihood of issuing
an optimistic recommendation following an equity o¤ering is di¤erent across the two periods - the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. For the pessimistic model, before the
regulations analysts were less likely to issue pessimistic recommendations for rms that have recently
issued equity (SEOIPOPRE negative and signicant). This e¤ect no longer exists in the Post-Reg
period (SEOIPO  POST is insignicant), and the di¤erence across periods is signicant at the 1%
level.
To further alleviate concerns that some of the previous results are driven by market timing behavior
of managers, we propose an alternative variable to capture rmsintentions to raise capital. Following
Frank and Goyal (2003), we argue that rmsdemand for capital is closely tied to their nancing
decit, dened as the excess cash outows over internally generated cash inows.21 The nancing
decit is an operational indicator of the need for external capital, and hence is less likely to be a¤ected
by managerial market timing. Using an indicator variable denoted by DEF; we distinguish between
rms that have a positive nancing decit and hence are in need of capital (DEF = 1) and rms that
have a negative nancing decit and whose demand for capital is low (DEF = 0):
In our sample, DEF is positively correlated with both concurrent and future equity issuance: The
correlation between DEF and equity issuance during the same year is 0.37, and with equity issuance
in the following year is 0.21. By its denition, DEF is not likely to be mechanically tied to analysts
optimism. If anything, analysts might not be optimistic about rms that experience nancing decits.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 report results parallel to those in columns (3) and (4), where we
21Formally, nancing decit in year t is dened as cash dividends plus net investments plus change in working capital
less cash inows from operations in year t: See Eq (1) in Frank and Goyal (2003) for details.
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replace SEOIPO with DEF: Consider rst the optimistic model. We nd that the coe¢ cient on
DEF  PRE is positive and signicant, indicating that before the regulations analysts were more
likely to issue optimistic recommendations for rms that were experiencing a nancing decit. The
coe¢ cient of DEF  POST is still signicantly positive but its magnitude is about three times
smaller. Moreover, the signicant di¤erences-in-di¤erences statistic indicates that nancing decit
plays a weaker role in analystsdecision to issue optimistic recommendations. A similar story is told
by the pessimistic model, only that the coe¢ cient of DEF  POST is insignicant. This indicates
that after the regulations, analysts are no longer reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations for
rms experiencing a nancing decit.
To summarize, the results in this section suggest that analysts have changed their recommendation
practices regarding rms that are likely to engage in future equity o¤erings. This reinforces the results
obtained in Section 5.1 regarding past underwriting relationships. We examined four types of cross-
sectional variations based on: a¢ liation, whether the bank is sanctioned, recent equity o¤erings, and
nancing decit. All of these analyses point to a reduction in optimism related to conicts of interest
following the regulations.
5.3 Price Reactions Related to Conicts of Interest
In Section 5.1 we documented a signicant change in the recommendation practices of a¢ liated vs.
una¢ liated analysts. Here we ask whether price responses to recommendations issued by analysts with
di¤erent levels of conicts of interest have changed after the regulations. Several papers examined price
reactions to recommendations issued by a¢ liated vs. una¢ liated analysts before the regulations.22
Overall, they nd that price reactions to optimistic recommendations were somewhat less positive
for a¢ liated analysts, although this result varies by sample period. Moreover, investors signicantly
discounted a¢ liated neutral recommendations before the regulations.
To examine whether the regulations were associated with di¤erent price reactions to recommen-
dations exposed to di¤erent levels of conicts of interest, we estimate a regression similar to Eq. (1).
But, in this case we interact each recommendation type with an a¢ liation dummy. Table 7 shows
22Michaely and Womack (1999) nd marginally signicant evidence that the stock price following a¢ liated buy
recommendations increases by less than following una¢ liated ones during 1990-1991. McNichols, OBrien, and Pamukcu
(2006) nd signicantly lower three-day price reactions to optimistic recommendations issued by a¢ liated analysts
during 1994-2001. In contrast, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003, 2007) do not nd a di¤erence between price reactions
to optimistic recommendations during 1996-2000. Finally, Lin and McNichols (1998) do nd a signicant di¤erence for
neutral recommendations.
21
that in the Pre-Reg period, una¢ liated and a¢ liated optimistic recommendations entail a similar ab-
normal price reaction. As for neutral recommendations, we nd strong and negative abnormal price
reactions to both a¢ liated and una¢ liated recommendations. Similar to Lin and McNichols (1998),
price reactions to neutral recommendations issued by a¢ liated analysts in the Pre-Reg period are sig-
nicantly more negative. This is consistent with investors accounting for the bias in neutral a¢ liated
recommendations before the regulations. For pessimistic recommendations, we do not nd a di¤erence
in price reactions between the two analyststypes. However, this may be due to lack of power, since
the number of pessimistic recommendations before the regulations is small.
During the Post-Reg period the reaction to optimistic recommendations is positive and signicant
for both a¢ liated and una¢ liated analysts, and there is no di¤erence between them. The di¤erence-in-
di¤erences across the two periods is not signicant (p-value of 0.5570). For neutral recommendations
we still see a signicant di¤erence between abnormal price reactions for a¢ liated vs. una¢ liated rec-
ommendations. That is, investors still seem to discount neutral a¢ liated recommendations. However,
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences statistic shows that the degree of discounting has signicantly decreased
(p-value of 0.0521). Finally, we do not observe a signicant change in the di¤erence in price reac-
tions to pessimistic recommendations across the two periods. These results suggest that the main
e¤ect of the regulations on investorsreactions to a¢ liated vs. una¢ liated recommendations was in
reinterpreting neutral recommendations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the e¤ects of regulations on sell-side analysts recommendations. The
regulations NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Settlement aimed at curbing the
conicts of interest between investment banking and research departments.
We document a massive migration of investment banks to a three-tier rating system following the
regulations that was accompanied by a more balanced distribution of recommendations. While this
change was somewhat cosmetic, it seems to have a¤ected the informativeness of recommendations. On
one hand, the literal meaning of recommendations better reects now the intentions of the analyst,
helping retail investors utilize recommendations. On the other hand, we present evidence that a smaller
number of tiers restricts the information content of recommendations.
Stock price reactions show that investors internalized the change in the distribution of recommen-
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dations. Price reactions to optimistic recommendations have become stronger after the regulations,
whereas price reactions to neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become less negative. The
overall informativeness of recommendations as measured by absolute abnormal price reactions has
declined following the regulations.
We show that conicts of interest were an important determinant of stock recommendations before
the regulations. A¢ liated analysts were signicantly more (less) likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic)
recommendations compared to una¢ liated analysts. After the regulations, a¢ liated analysts are
no longer more likely to issue optimistic recommendations. However, they are still less likely to
issue pessimistic recommendations compared to una¢ liated analysts. Alternative variables capturing
conicts of interest that account for expected future underwriting relationships show similar results:
Analysts are no longer excessively optimistic about rms that have recently undergone an equity
o¤ering. Additionally, the optimism of analysts about the prospects of rms that experience a nancing
decit was signicantly reduced. An analysis of price reactions to recommendations provides mixed
evidence on whether investors discount a¢ liated recommendations to a lesser extent than they did
before the regulations.
These results suggest that the regulations had some success in curbing conicts of interest. Investors
seem to be aware of the changes in analystspractices, as reected in their price reactions. However,
overall, the informativeness of recommendations has declined in the period following the regulations.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Recommendations, Brokerage Houses, and Equity Offerings 
This table presents summary statistics on stock recommendations, brokerage houses, and equity offerings during our sample period (November 2000 – December 
2004). Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002. Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. Panel A reports 
the number of stock recommendations, their mean, and their standard deviation. When calculating the mean and standard deviations, we assign stock 
recommendations a numeric value as follows: “strong buy” and “buy”=2, “hold”=3, “underperform” and “sell”=4. The hypothesis that there is no difference in 
means across periods is rejected at a significance level of less than 1%. Panel B presents summary statistics on brokerage houses’ participation in equity 
offerings. We report results aggregated for the sanctioned brokerage houses that initially participated in the Global Settlement as well as for the twenty next 
biggest brokerage houses (non-sanctioned). For this purpose, the size of brokerage house is proxied by the number of recommendations issued throughout the 
period for U.S. common stocks.  We consider a brokerage house to have participated in an equity offering if it was a lead underwriter in the offering. If there are 
joint lead underwriters, the participation variables (offerings and proceeds) are divided proportionally among all lead underwriters. Equity offerings include all 
IPOs and SEOs. Panel C reports summary statistics of various variables for sample firms that underwent an IPO or an SEO during the years 1998-2004.  We 
report statistics about the proceeds received in the equity offering (in millions of dollars), the market capitalization as of the end of the fiscal year of the IPO or 
SEO (in millions of dollars), and the book-to-market ratio defined as book value of equity divided by market capitalization.  
 
Panel A: Stock recommendations 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
N 64,383 89,029 
Mean  2.44 2.69 
Std.  0.57 0.67 
 
 
Panel B: Brokerage houses and equity offerings 
 % of all equity offerings % of all proceeds in equity offerings 
 Sanctioned Non-sanctioned Sanctioned Non-sanctioned 
2000 58% 16% 78% 10% 
2001 71% 14% 87% 9% 
2002 63% 19% 85% 10% 
2003 60% 21% 80% 15% 
2004 61% 24% 79% 17% 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Equity offerings 
 2003-2004 2001-2002 1998-2000 2003-2004 2001-2002 1998-2000 
 IPOs SEOs 
N 123 107 331 541 430 365 
Proceeds (Mil $) 
Mean 216.1 348.6 162.70 170.4 199.9 271.1 
Median 96.0 114.0 72.30 98.1 110.1 147.4 
Std. 380.3 898.1 412.86 252.7 281.4 377.4 
Market capitalization (Mil $) 
Mean 976.9 1777.9 2135.84 3264.1 3038.7 5799.8 
Median 444.3 489.9 693.57 1119.1 826.8 1136.3 
Std. 1682.0 6118.1 6149.35 18515.9 7650.5 26164.4 
Book-to-market ratio 
Mean 0.33 0.45 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.37 
Median 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.49 0.28 
Std. 0.23 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.49 0.59 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Events of Changes of Ratings Systems 
This table reports summary statistics on the events of change in rating systems for the eight brokerage houses among the sanctioned banks that changed their 
system in 2002. For each event, the table shows the date it occurred, the number of stocks whose coverage was discontinued at the event, and the number of 
stocks with continued coverage. For each group of stocks, we report the percentage of stocks that were pessimistic, neutral, or optimistic before the change, based 
on the ratings they received after the new ratings system was put into place (pessimistic, neutral, or optimistic). Optimistic recommendations are “strong buy” 
and “buy”; neutral recommendations are “hold”; and pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” 
 
Recommendations after the change →  Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic 
      Recommendation 
before the change 
  Recommendation 
before the change 
  Recommendation 
before the change 
  
Date of 
change 
# of 
Discont-
inued 
coverage 
# of 
Stocks 
covered 
after 
change 
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Broker 1 9-8-02 136 1019 20 0 4 80 15 38 1 0 60 40 42 0 0 2 98 
Broker 2 9-8-02 143 946 5 0 96 2 2 47 0 0 87 13 48 1 0 0 99 
Broker 3 9-8-02 80 916 28 0 8 77 15 38 0 1 37 62 34 0 0 3 97 
Broker 4 3-17-02 70 768 21 0 5 85 10 46 1 0 57 42 33 1 0 3 96 
Broker 5 9-25-02 128 743 26 1 4 71 24 45 0 0 33 67 29 0 0 1 98 
Broker 6 11-4-02 141 736 21 0 11 71 18 56 0 0 40 60 24 1 0 2 97 
Broker 7 8-4-02 97 791 27 0 2 78 20 40 0 0 28 72 33 0 0 2 98 
Broker 8 9-8-02 119 639 18 1 7 66 26 44 0 0 44 56 38 1 0 2 97 
Total 
    0.2 9 73.5 17.3  0.3 0.1 49.9 49.8  0.5 0 1.8 97.7 
 914 6,558 20%     44%     36%     
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Table 3. Price Reactions to and Frequencies of Recommendations. The table reports frequencies of recommendations as well as regression results of the basic 
regression: 
1 2 3* * * .RET OPT NEUT PESS Controls eα α α= + + + +  
The dependent variable, RET, is the size- and industry-adjusted return measured during a three-day period centered on the issuance of the stock recommendation. 
The indicator variables equal 1 as follows: OPT=1 for “buy” and “strong buy”; NEU=1 for “hold”; PESS=1 for “underperform” and “sell.”  PASTFIRMPERF is 
the size- and industry-adjusted firm’s stock return in the six months prior to the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six 
months prior to the recommendation.  EXPERIENCE is the analyst’s experience, defined as the number of years the analyst has appeared in IBES.  Each model is 
run separately for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002, and Post-Reg is the period between 
September 2002 and December 2004. The P-value column reports p-values of tests of differences between the coefficients in the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and presented in parentheses.  *, **, *** represent significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 Event return over [-1,+1] Frequencies of  Rec. 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg P-value Pre-Reg Post-Reg P-value Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
OPT 0.0121*** 0.0220*** 0.000 0.0122*** 0.0197*** 0.000 57.90% 42.19% 
 (0.0007) 
 
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0008) 
  
  
NEU -0.0446*** -0.0176*** 0.000 -0.0443*** -0.0196*** 0.000 38.36% 46.92% 
 (0.0017) 
 
(0.0008) 
  
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0010) 
  
  
PESS -0.0745*** -0.0397*** 0.000 -0.0749*** -0.0417*** 0.000 3.74% 10.89% 
 (0.0056) 
 
(0.0017) 
  
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0018) 
  
  
PASTFIRMPERF    0.0198*** 0.0007 0.000   
 
  
 (0.0030) 
 
(0.0020) 
  
  
PASTMKTPERF    0.0390*** 0.0480*** 0.513   
 
  
 (0.0126) 
 
(0.0057) 
  
  
EXPERIENCE    0.0007*** 0.0001 0.007   
 
  
 (0.0002) 
 
(0.0001) 
  
  
Observations 51,194 65,476  45,284 62,738    
R2 0.07 0.06  0.08 0.07    
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Table 4.  Informativeness Tests 
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the size- and industry-adjusted return (ABS_RET) measured during a 
three-day period centered around the issuance of the stock recommendation. POST equals 1 if the recommendation is 
issued between September 2002 and December 2004.  PASTFIRMPERF is the size- and industry-adjusted firm’s stock 
return in the six months prior to the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six months 
prior to the recommendation.  EXPERIENCE is the analyst’s experience, defined as the number of years the analyst has 
appeared in IBES.  MKT_STD is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month prior to the recommendation.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and presented in parentheses. SANCT is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who is employed by a sanctioned brokerage house. TIER3 is an indicator 
variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid at the time a recommendation is issued. *, 
**, *** represent significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.0720*** 0.0690*** 0.0706*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
POST -0.0222*** -0.0150*** -0.0179*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
TIER3  -0.0092*** -0.0086*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) 
SANCT  -0.0039*** 0.0019* 
  (0.0007) (0.0010) 
SANCT*POST   -0.0100*** 
   (0.0012) 
PASTFIRMPERF  -0.0355*** -0.0354*** 
   (0.0017) (0.0017) 
PASTMKTPERF  -0.0129*** -0.0153*** 
   -0.0048 (0.0048) 
MKT_STD  0.6329*** 0.6302*** 
   (0.1123) (0.1122) 
EXPERIENCE  -0.0007*** -0.0016*** 
   -0.0001 (0.0002) 
EXPERIENCE*POST   0.0013*** 
   (0.0002) 
Observations 133,800 127,786 127,786 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.04 
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Table 5.  Distribution of Recommendations for Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 
This table reports the frequency of stock recommendations in various groups of firms during the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg 
periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002, and Post-Reg is the period between September 
2002 and December 2004. The stock recommendations are issued in the window of 24 months after an IPO or SEO. Panel 
A reports recommendations of affiliated analysts for IPO and SEO firms. Panel B reports recommendations by unaffiliated 
analysts for IPO and SEO firms. Affiliated analysts are employed by the lead underwriter(s) or the co-manager(s) of the 
equity offering. The IPOs and SEOs reported occurred in the period starting in November 1998 and ending in December 
2004. We extend the beginning of the sample period to November 1998 for the IPOs and SEOs to allow for inclusion of 
recommendations in the Pre-Reg period that refer to IPOs and SEOs that occurred before November 2000.  
Panel A: Affiliated analysts 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
Buy (%) 69.6 49.0 
Hold (%) 28.3 44.5 
Sell (%) 2.1 6.5 
Panel B: Unaffiliated analysts 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
Buy (%) 63.9 48.0 
Hold (%) 32.7 42.8 
Sell (%) 3.4 9.2 
Panel C: IPOs 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
Buy (%) 64.8 56.0 
Hold (%) 32.4 39.4 
Sell (%) 2.8 4.6 
Panel D: SEOs 
 Pre-Reg Post-Reg 
Buy (%) 65.7 46.6 
Hold (%) 31.2 44.2 
Sell (%) 3.1 9.0 
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Table 6. Panel Data Logistic Regressions Relating Optimism/Pessimism to Past and Future Underwriting 
Relationships 
The table presents results of logistic regressions whose dependent variable equals 1 when a recommendation is either 
optimistic or pessimistic. All models use firm fixed effects. Optimistic recommendations are “strong buy” and “buy,” and 
pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” AFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the broker issuing 
the recommendation was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the 
recommendation announcement date. SEOIPO is an indicator variable equaling 1 if a firm has gone through an IPO or an 
SEO in a period of 6 to 24 months prior to the recommendation. DEF takes a value of 1 if a firm’s financial deficit in the 
year of recommendation is positive. SANCT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
analyst who is employed by a sanctioned brokerage house. PASTFIRMPERF is the size- and industry-adjusted firm’s 
stock return in the six months prior to the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six 
months prior to the recommendation. EXPERIENCE is the analyst’s experience, defined as the number of years the 
analyst has appeared in IBES. TIER3 is an indicator variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier 
recommendation grid at the time a recommendation is issued. PRE and POST are indicator variables equaling 1 when the 
recommendation is issued respectively in the Pre-Reg or Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 
and August 2002, and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Table appears in the next page.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Prob 
(Rec=OPT) 
Prob 
(Rec=PES) 
Prob 
(Rec=OPT) 
Prob 
(Rec=PES) 
Prob 
(Rec=OPT) 
Prob 
(Rec=PES) 
AFF*PRE 0.1997*** -0.5499*** 0.2093*** -0.4252** 0.2804*** -0.5462*** 
  (0.0616) (0.1849) (0.0554) (0.1725) (0.0570) (0.1723) 
SEOIPO*PRE   0.2097*** -0.3890***   
   (0.0425) (0.1124)   
DEF*PRE     0.2045*** -0.2984*** 
     (0.0315) (0.0781) 
SANCT*PRE 0.0205 -0.1946 -0.001 -0.2443*** 0.0055 -0.2336*** 
  (0.0497) (0.1536) (0.0232) (0.0665) (0.0232) (0.0680) 
PASTMKTPERF*PRE 0.9947*** -1.9868* 0.6287*** -2.6709*** 0.6613*** -2.7250*** 
  (0.3752) (1.1245) (0.1483) (0.4570) (0.1498) (0.4677) 
PASTFIRMPERF*PRE 0.8365*** -0.4413* 0.6909*** -0.9484*** 0.6812*** -0.8744*** 
  (0.1192) (0.2490) (0.0471) (0.1206) (0.0472) (0.1255) 
EXPERIENCE *PRE -0.0081 -0.0102 -0.0101*** 0.0028 -0.0068* 0.0023 
  (0.0082) (0.0246) (0.0038) (0.0103) (0.0037) (0.0104) 
TIER3*PRE 0.1457** 0.2530* 0.1259*** 0.2781*** 0.1367*** 0.2857*** 
  (0.0588) (0.1524) (0.0259) (0.0708) (0.0253) (0.0700) 
POST -0.8876*** 1.3079*** -0.6696*** 1.5073*** -0.6084*** 1.4250*** 
  (0.0994) (0.1912) (0.0360) (0.0885) (0.0395) (0.0947) 
AFF*POST 0.0213 -0.3872*** 0.0581 -0.4071*** 0.0062 -0.3883*** 
  (0.0526) (0.1024) (0.0483) (0.0884) (0.0487) (0.0900) 
SANCT*POST -0.4360*** 0.5630*** -0.3559*** 0.4095*** -0.3555*** 0.4130*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0978) (0.0227) (0.0360) (0.0227) (0.0364) 
SEOIPO*POST   -0.1225*** -0.0491   
    (0.0421) (0.0667)   
DEF*POST     0.0600** -0.0408 
     (0.0279) (0.0429) 
PASTMKTPERF*POST 0.5627** -0.1706 0.8336*** -0.2860** 0.8526*** -0.2934** 
  (0.2422) (0.3896) (0.0936) (0.1296) (0.0910) (0.1332) 
PASTFIRMPERF*POST 0.1731*** -0.2284* 0.1636*** -0.2585*** 0.1551*** -0.2586*** 
  (0.0667) (0.1263) (0.0296) (0.0534) (0.0292) (0.0546) 
EXPERIENCE *POST -0.0062 0.0107 0.0005 0.0065 0.0016 0.0053 
  (0.0069) (0.0119) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0027) (0.0046) 
TIER3*POST -0.3337*** 0.2097** -0.3113*** 0.1280*** -0.3069*** 0.1152*** 
  (0.0472) (0.0922) (0.0191) (0.0349) (0.0195) (0.0348) 
Observations 21,713 13,242 119,580 97,282 114,937 93,631 
            
Difference-in-Differences          
Hypothesis (p-values)        
AFF*PRE=AFF*POST 0.0245 0.4330     
SANCT*PRE=SANCT*POST 0.0000 0.0000     
SEPIPO*PRE=SEOIPO*POST   0.0000 0.0055   
DEF*PRE=DEF*POST     0.0001 0.0020 
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Table 7. Price Reactions to Recommendations Based on Underwriting Relationships 
This table presents tests of difference in price reactions, measured by size- and industry-adjusted returns, to recommendations based on whether the analyst 
issuing the recommendation faced potential conflicts of interest.  We analyze event reactions, i.e., returns over a three-day period centered on the issuance of the 
stock recommendation.  Returns are reported separately for the Pre-Reg and Post-Reg periods. Pre-Reg is the period between November 2000 and August 2002, 
and Post-Reg is the period between September 2002 and December 2004. In addition, two groups of recommendations are analyzed: (1) recommendations for 
firms that have raised equity in the past 24 months and that were issued by affiliated analysts, i.e., analysts employed by a lead underwriter or a co-manager of 
the offering, and (2) recommendations for firms that have raised equity in the past 24 months and that were not issued by affiliated analysts. The p-value columns 
report p-values of tests of differences between the returns of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts for IPO/SEO firms, and the returns of affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts for non-IPO/SEO firms. PASTFIRMPERF is the size- and industry-adjusted firm’s stock return in the six months prior to the recommendation. 
PASTMKTPERF is the cumulative market return in the six months prior to the recommendation. EXPERIENCE is the analyst’s experience, defined as the 
number of years the analyst has appeared in IBES.  Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and presented in parentheses.  *, **, *** represent 
significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 POST PRE 
Difference in 
Differences 
 Affiliated Unaffiliated P-value Affiliated Unaffiliated P-value P-value 
 (1) (2) (1)=(2) (1) (2) (1)=(2)  
OPT 0.0184*** 0.0129*** 0.2261 0.0077 0.0077* 0.9958 0.5570 
  (0.0042) (0.0023)   (0.0075) (0.0044)    
NEU -0.0387*** -0.0268*** 0.0569 -0.1104*** -0.0738*** 0.0010 0.0521 
  (0.0055) (0.0034)   (0.0100) (0.0065)    
PESS -0.0695*** -0.0571*** 0.2668 -0.1211*** -0.1282*** 0.8638 0.6477 
  (0.0104) (0.0061)   (0.0311) (0.0288)    
PASTFIRMPERF 0.0062 -0.0041 0.2192 0.0254** 0.0135 0.3341 0.9111 
  (0.0083) (0.0049)   (0.0111) (0.0088)    
PASTMKTPERF 0.1256*** 0.0683*** 0.0246 0.1723*** 0.0219 0.2940 0.1565 
  (0.0284) (0.0242)   (0.0584) (0.0322)    
EXPERIENCE -0.0011** 0.0003 0.0853 0.0020* 0.0005 0.0108 0.4189 
  (0.0005) (0.0003)   (0.0011) (0.0008)    
Observations 3,064 6,990   2,165 7,888    
R-squared 0.12 0.08   0.22 0.11    
 
